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This article has been developed from a paper originally 
prepared for the 2013 Salzburg Workshop on Cyber 
Investigations under the supervision of Professors 
Laurel E. Fletcher, Chris Hoofnagle, Eric Stover, and 
Jennifer Urban. 
Abstract 
This paper provides background on the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA or Act) and 
examines the circumstances surrounding the passage 
of the Act, its important provisions and their 
exceptions, and how the Act affects investigations by 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
International criminal prosecutions increasingly rely 
on cyber investigations to uncover digital evidence 
that can be subsequently admitted in court 
proceedings. The ASPA restricts U.S. cooperation 
with the ICC and its investigations within the United 
States. As the majority of e-mails and social media 
platforms are linked to U.S. entities, and given the 
information-gathering and information-storage 
capacities of the U.S. government, information 
touching upon or residing in the United States often 
can be of assistance to ICC cyber investigations. This 
article examines the current administration’s 
increased engagement with the ICC within the scope 
of the ASPA, as well as whether or not this 
engagement suggests that revisions should be made 
to the Act. These questions serve as the starting 
point for examining the nexus of cyber 
investigations, the ASPA, and the International 
Criminal Court. 
Introduction 
This paper examines the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act 22 U.S.C. §§ 2004(h), 2013(12) (2008), 
which was signed into law by then-President George 
W. Bush on 2 August 2002. The Act contains a broad 
prohibition on cooperation between the United States 
and the International Criminal Court, strictly 
prohibiting U.S. “support” to the ICC and limiting ICC 
“investigative activity” within the United States. 
Notwithstanding these broad restrictions, the ASPA 
contains exceptions that allow for conditional 
assistance to the ICC. The most important of these is 
the Dodd Amendment, which allows for U.S. 
cooperation with ICC prosecutions of foreign nationals 
on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with ASPA § 
2015. 
As the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) increases its 
efforts to collect and introduce digital evidence in 
proceedings, it is necessary to understand how the 
ASPA applies to digital information under the control, 
or within the territory, of the United States. 
Furthermore, knowledge of the Act’s exceptions can 
assist in identifying possible avenues for U.S. 
cooperation with OTP investigations. This knowledge 
takes on an added importance in the context of digital 
information, given that the majority of digital 
information is controlled by U.S.-based Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs). Furthermore, building 
working relationships with U.S.-based ISPs is critical to 
engaging the technology industry in cooperating with 
the ICC and to utilizing the vast resources and 
expertise the industry has to offer the ICC. 
Accordingly, this paper examines (1) the political 
environment at the time the Act was passed; (2) the 
Act’s influence on the investigative abilities of the ICC; 
(3) the ways in which the U.S. is using the Dodd 
Amendment and other exceptions to support the OTP 
and the ICC in general; (4) what potential 
considerations might be involved if the ICC were to 
request information from a U.S. entity; and (5) the 
unresolved questions regarding the functions of the 
Act and its reach. 
This paper is based on limited research, and does not 
include classified or internal documents on the Act’s 
operations. It sets out to provide a background and 
understanding of the framework of ASPA, as it is 
publicly known. The findings are based on primary and 
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secondary research on the ASPA, as well as interviews 
conducted with government officials with knowledge 
of the ASPA’s operations. 
Legislative History 
The United States was an initial supporter of the ICC, 
and it actively participated in the negotiations leading 
up to the final conference in Rome.1 However, as the 
conference approached a final vote on the statute 
(the Rome Statute), U.S. officials realized certain 
critical negotiating objectives would not be achieved, 
and U.S. support for the Rome Statute quickly 
diminished.2 David Scheffer, former Ambassador-at-
Large on War Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of 
State and lead U.S. negotiator in Rome, unsuccessfully 
attempted to stall to allow the U.S. to have more time 
to reconsider the Statute before the conference voted 
on deliberations.3 On 1 July 2002, after receiving the 
necessary sixty ratifications for implementation, the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
entered into force.4 
There were a number of American concerns about the 
new international court. After the Rome Statute vote, 
Ambassador Scheffer reported to Congress that the 
Rome Statute could potentially “inhibit the ability of 
the United States to use its military to meet alliance 
obligations and participate in multinational 
operations, including humanitarian interventions to 
save civilian lives.”5 The U.S. had two principal 
concerns. First, the ICC’s possible exercise of 
jurisdiction over non-party nationals prompted 
sovereignty concerns related to the prosecution of 
U.S. troops and civilians serving abroad.6 Second, the 
lack of prosecutorial accountability, as well as the 
potential for prosecutions based on political 
considerations, raised concerns about the possibility 
that investigations might be specifically directed at 
                                                          
1 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the 
War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012), 192. 
2 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls, 207. 
3 David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls, 207. 
4 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
5 111th Congress, 2nd Session, Bill number H. R. 5351, House of 
Representatives, 20 May 2010, section 2(3) Findings, at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr5351ih/xml/BILLS-
111hr5351ih.xml . 
6 Jennifer K. Elsea, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 
for Congress: U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court 
(29 August 2006), 5-6, available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31495.pdf . 
American citizens.7 Although the U.S.—during the 
closing days of the Clinton Administration—ultimately 
signed the Rome Statute in 2000, it subsequently 
notified the United Nations Secretary General in May 
2002 that it did not intend to become a party.8 The 
U.S. thereby relieved itself of an obligation not to 
defeat the Statute’s object and purpose.9 U.S. 
concerns then set the stage for subsequent legislation 
in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act. 
The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act 
became law in August 2002, supplementing already 
existing legislation that placed a prohibition on use of 
U.S. funds to support the ICC.10 Senator Jesse Helms 
introduced the ASPA legislation,11 which the Senate 
adopted as an amendment to the Supplemental 
Defense Appropriations Act of 2002.12 Senator Helms 
and other legislators argued that the legislation was 
necessary because the ICC threatened U.S. 
sovereignty.13 Therefore, they included a provision 
allowing the President to use “all means necessary 
and appropriate” to release U.S. personnel detained 
on behalf of the ICC, as well as other provisions 
restricting cooperation with the ICC.14 Senator 
Christopher Dodd, however, managed to add 
language to the Act that expressly permitted a certain 
degree of U.S. cooperation with the ICC.15 This mixed 
result reflected divided Congressional opinions as to 
whether there should be cooperation with the ICC 
with respect to cases involving individuals accused of 
committing serious international crimes. 
                                                          
7 Jennifer K. Elsea, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal 
Court at 7-8. Other U.S. concerns included the fact that fewer due 
process guarantees existed under the Rome Statute than the U.S. 
Constitution, as well as an American belief that the ICC would 
interfere with U.N. Security Council operations: Jennifer K. Elsea, 
U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court at 8-11. 
8 William H. Taft, IV and others, U.S. Policy Toward the International 
Criminal Court: Furthering Positive Engagement (American Society 
of International Law, March 2009), 30-31. 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 18, opened for 
signature on 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
10 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act serves as a continuous 
and current prohibition on U.S. funding of the ICC. It provides: “None 
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act 
may be obligated for use by, or for support of, the International 
Criminal Court unless the United States has become a party to the 
Court ....” 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2008). 
11 147 CONG. REC. 24,377 (2001). 
12 148 CONG. REC. 14,051 (2002). 
13 148 CONG. REC. 9589 (2002). 
14 ASPA § 2008. 
15 148 CONG. REC. 9590 (2002). 
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Functions and Operations 
The ASPA currently prohibits U.S. cooperation with 
ICC investigations in three ways. First, the term 
“support” limits the extent of U.S. assistance to the 
ICC. Second, a prohibition on ICC “investigative 
activity” is included in the Act to prevent ICC 
investigations within the United States. Third, the Act 
prohibits the sharing of intelligence and law 
enforcement information with the ICC or with any 
State Parties to the Rome Statute.16 
Defining “support” 
The prohibition on “support” can be broadly 
interpreted to limit virtually any U.S. governmental 
“agency or entity of the United States Government or 
of any State or local government, including any court” 
from cooperating in any manner with the ICC.17 
Therefore, essentially all public entities are prohibited 
from providing support to the ICC. 
The Act defines support as “assistance of any kind, 
including financial support, transfer of property or 
other material support, services, intelligence sharing, 
law enforcement cooperation, the training or detail of 
personnel, and the arrest or detention of 
individuals.”18 Furthermore, “[n]o classified national 
security information can be transferred directly or 
indirectly to the ICC.”19 Senator John Warner, 
discussing the ASPA on the Senate floor in 2002, 
elaborated that the prohibition included “searches 
and seizures, discovery, asset seizure … [and] 
otherwise render[ing] services to the ICC.”20 
Defining “investigative activity within the United 
States” 
The prohibition on investigative activities of agents 
limits the activities of the ICC in the United States. It 
provides that “[n]o agent of the International Criminal 
Court may conduct, in the United States or any 
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
                                                          
16 148 CONG. REC. 9590 (2002). 
17 ASPA §§ 2004(e), (h), 2013(12) 
18 ASPA § 2013(12). As Senator Warner explained, “no Federal or 
State entity, including courts, may cooperate with the ICC in law 
enforcement matters,” including: arrest, extradition, search and 
seizure, discovery, asset seizure, financial support, transfer of 
property, personnel details, intelligence sharing, or otherwise 
rendering services to the ICC. 148 CONG. REC. 9589 (2002). 
19 ASPA § 2006; 148 CONG. REC. 9589 (2002). 
20 148 CONG. REC. 9589 (2002). 
States, any investigative activity relating to a 
preliminary inquiry, investigation, prosecution, or 
other proceeding at the International Criminal 
Court.”21 Although an authoritative interpretation of 
the statute from the Office of Legal Counsel, 
Department of Justice, has not been made public,22 a 
restrictive reading of “investigative activity” could 
prohibit virtually any ICC activity within the United 
States. Both the clauses, “investigative activity” and 
“in the United States”, could prohibit ICC personnel 
from conducting any activities in support of either 
their examination of witnesses or their investigations 
on U.S. soil. The restrictions could extend to a smaller 
scale of activity than one might initially assume from 
reading the text of the Act. For example, this reading 
may even prohibit investigative activity involving an 
ICC investigator contacting a witness located in the 
United States. Because the call is pursuant to an ICC 
investigation, the provisions of the ASPA could be 
interpreted to require the witness to relocate outside 
the U.S. before speaking with an ICC agent about 
anything of substance regarding the individual’s 
potential testimony. These examples demonstrate the 
extent of ASPA’s interference on ICC investigative 
activity with a restrictive reading of the Act. 
A more liberal reading focuses on the physical location 
of the ICC investigator. The investigative activity 
provision of the ASPA then would not be affected until 
the ICC investigator enters U.S. territory, and so a 
telephone call to a potential witness may not be 
prohibited. Or, if the telephone call is not 
investigatory in nature, the call itself may be exempt. 
The reading of what is “investigative” and what is 
considered “within the United States” goes to the 
heart of issues with cyber investigations and the 
ASPA. 
Obtaining digital evidence from service 
providers 
The extent to which considerations related to the 
ASPA limit the ability of the ICC to gather digital 
evidence from U.S. service providers remains unclear. 
This is important for investigations because a large 
amount of information flows through U.S. service 
providers. As described below, there is nothing in the 
                                                          
21 ASPA § 2004(h). 
22 Furthermore, research for this paper has not found any 
interpretation of ASPA in this context by any court of the United 
States. 
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statutory language to suggest that U.S. service 
providers that hold digital evidence are bound by its 
restrictions. However, service providers may be 
reluctant to cooperate for practical, political, or other 
reasons. Further, establishing the location of data can 
be relatively difficult. Overall, ICC investigators will 
need to develop protocols for accessing digital 
evidence from service providers.23 
The jurisdiction of the ASPA and private legal entities  
On its face, the ASPA restricts only the actions of 
public entities, not private companies such as Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs or service providers). 
Specifically, the Act states that “no United States 
Court, and no agency or entity of any State or local 
government, including any court, may cooperate with 
the International Criminal Court in response to a 
request for cooperation submitted by the 
International Criminal Court pursuant to the Rome 
Statute.”24 However, a question remains as to 
whether or not private U.S. entities would want to 
cooperate with the ICC, or feel obligated to do so, 
given that the Rome Statute does not bind the United 
States. 
There exist important threshold questions as to how 
private companies might respond to requests for 
information from the ICC. There is the possibility of a 
discouraging effect, where private legal entities may 
be unwilling to cooperate because of political 
considerations surrounding the ASPA and related 
fears of governmental retribution for cooperation 
with the ICC. This effect is also recognised regarding 
other complex U.S. statutes, such as when a statute 
imposes sanctions for prohibited conduct with a 
foreign entity, and companies may restrict conduct 
beyond that specified in the statute for fear of being 
in violation. Most importantly, ISPs will question the 
release of private information pertaining to account 
                                                          
23 Possible routes for obtaining information, if not prohibited by the 
“investigative activity” prohibition of the ASPA are: 1) the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process or the similar letters 
rogatory process; 2) requests made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782, 
which allows U.S. federal district courts to provide assistance to 
foreign and international tribunals; 3) relationships with U.S. law 
enforcement agencies, which may allow those agencies to obtain 
information through U.S.-domestic channels and share information 
with the ICC on a case-by-case basis; and 4) retrieving information 
available through States Parties to the Rome Statute (but note the 
issue of retrieving the large amounts of data stored solely in the 
United States would remain if exercising this option). A more 
complete discussion of these alternatives is outside the scope of this 
paper, as it is limited to identifying the background issues associated 
with gathering of digital evidence by the ICC. 
24 ASPA § 2004. 
holders to an investigative agency. There are strict 
requirements under U.S. law for release of such 
information, and ISPs have formal processes for 
making and complying with requests; absent strict 
compliance, information generally will not be 
released.25 
Location of data in cyber investigations  
Data relevant to investigations may be difficult to 
locate. U.S. service providers have placed their data 
centers across the world in order to gain efficiency, 
speed up user access to data, and to comply with local 
legal requirements. Accordingly, data may be 
available without access to a server located within the 
United States. Complications, however, can arise in 
terms of where the data is stored and what 
jurisdiction governs access to the data. 
The location of data may not be available, due to the 
difficulty in knowing precisely where the data is 
located. This is partly because the data is copied 
throughout different servers, and service providers 
may not want to or be able to provide location 
information. For data that may be stored outside the 
United States, however, obtaining the data may 
involve identifying and following the legal and 
procedural requirements of the local jurisdiction.26 For 
example, if an American student travels to a country 
in Europe, her cloud-based e-mail service may copy 
the archive of her e-mail to servers in the country to 
which she travels to improve access to the data. This 
scenario, however, may be limited to situations where 
data is known to be copied or stored outside of the 
United States. The greatest difficulty in obtaining the 
data may actually be determining its location. 
In theory, digital evidence should be obtainable from 
service providers, but a variety of factors may 
complicate any particular investigation. Outstanding 
questions include whether service providers consider 
themselves to be bound or limited by the restrictions 
the ASPA imposes, difficulties surrounding locating 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Yahoo! Compliance Guide for Law Enforcement, 
http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/yahoo-spy.pdf. 
26 The Terms of Service agreement of an individual user’s account 
will determine the jurisdiction that governs requests for information 
pertaining to that user’s account. For non-U.S. accounts, the ICC 
should make requests to the specified jurisdiction. However, users 
outside the United States may have accepted the same Terms of 
Service as a user in the United States, thereby necessitating that a 
request for information be sent to a U.S. jurisdiction. The specified 
jurisdiction varies based on the structuring of each company and its 
Terms of Service agreements. 
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the data, and developing protocols for obtaining data 
from U.S.-based or foreign servers owned by U.S.-
based service providers. 
Special exceptions to prohibitions in the 
ASPA 
There are some statutory exceptions to the 
prohibitions on U.S. cooperation with the ICC. First, 
the Dodd Amendment allows U.S. agencies to share 
information with the ICC.27 Second, the President may 
cooperate with or transfer national security 
information to the ICC when the cooperation is 
pursuant to his duties as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces.28 Third, the President may waive 
restrictions, for one-year periods, on both U.S. 
participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and on 
U.S. military assistance to States Parties.29 All of these 
exceptions, however, are accompanied by limitations, 
and are examined in this section. 
The Dodd Amendment 
Section 2015 of the Act, also known as the Dodd 
Amendment, counteracts the broad prohibition on 
supporting the ICC. Because the Amendment applies 
to ICC investigations of foreign nationals, it can serve, 
in the view of some commentators, as a “catch-all 
exception authorizing the U.S. government to 
participate in a wide range of international justice 
efforts”30 provided U.S. persons are not at risk of 
prosecution. The Amendment, which is contained in a 
section entitled “Assistance to International Efforts,” 
provides: 
Nothing in this title shall prohibit the United 
States from rendering assistance to 
international efforts to bring to justice 
Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, Osama 
bin Laden, other members of Al Qaeda, 
leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign 
                                                          
27 The State Department’s Rewards Programs: Performance and 
Potential: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of 
Stephen Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global Criminal 
Justice). 
28 ASPA § 2011. 
29 ASPA §§ 2003, 2005, 2007. 
30 148 CONG. REC. 15,659 (2002). The purpose of the ASPA is to 
protect against ICC prosecutions of U.S. nationals. 
nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or 
crimes against humanity.31 
The Amendment ensures that U.S. cooperation with 
the ICC is possible when (1) the ICC has jurisdiction 
over an international crime, (2) when a foreign 
national (as opposed to U.S. national) is being 
investigated or prosecuted, and (3) when there is no 
U.S. objection to that jurisdiction (such as when U.S. 
nationals – or, potentially, U.S. allies – could be 
prosecuted).32 
The Dodd Amendment is the primary exception the 
United States has invoked to directly assist the 
investigative efforts of the ICC. The Amendment 
operates on a case-by-case basis. For each ICC request 
for information that is within the control of a United 
States public entity, the ICC submits a request to the 
U.S. embassy at The Hague. The embassy then 
transmits the requests to the State Department, 
where they are reviewed internally and within an 
interagency process.33 For a typical request, an 
internal memorandum will be circulated to relevant 
agencies, allowing for an opportunity to object to 
case-specific information sharing. In the absence of 
any objection, the request will be approved. For 
atypical requests, the relevant agencies and 
authorities may meet face-to-face to weigh competing 
policy considerations. Although limited in scope, this 
approach permits U.S. cooperation with the ICC, while 
also allowing the U.S. to retain control over the extent 
of its cooperation. 
Presidential waivers 
Various Presidential waivers exist that circumvent the 
prohibitions of the ASPA. For instance, section 2011 of 
the ASPA permits the President, pursuant to his 
powers as Commander in Chief, to share information 
in his control with the ICC.34 It does not appear that 
the President has invoked this waiver at the date of 
writing. However, members of Congress have already 
indicated how this waiver could be implemented. 
Speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives 
in 2002, Senator Henry Hyde, who introduced the 
                                                          
31 ASPA § 2015. 
32 148 CONG. REC. 15,659 (2002). 
33 The State Department’s Rewards Programs: Performance and 
Potential: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation, and Trade, 112th Cong. 112-29 (2012) (statement 
of Stephen Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global Criminal 
Justice). 
34 148 CONG. REC. 14,050 (2002). 
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ASPA in the House, explained that this exception turns 
on the “parameters of the President’s authority under 
the Constitution,” and is decided on a “case-by-case 
basis” by the President. He also clarified that this 
waiver can be used to facilitate the transfer of foreign 
nationals to the ICC. Importantly, he noted that this 
provision also allows the President to provide 
classified national security information to the ICC. 
However, this waiver cannot be used by the President 
to order state and local governments to undertake 
any action vis-à-vis the ICC, a power not within the 
President’s executive authority. In his remarks, 
Representative Hyde also stated that there might be 
other situations, not yet explored, where this 
presidential waiver could be used.35 
Other waivers also exist in the ASPA that govern the 
participation of U.S. Armed Forces in peace keeping 
missions. First, a waiver in section 2003 authorizes the 
President to waive restrictions on peace keeping in 
section 2005. This waiver also applied to section 2007, 
before it was removed in the 2008 amended version 
of ASPA.36 Second, section 2003 also waives 
prohibitions in sections 2004 and 2006 that govern 
United States cooperation with an investigation or 
prosecution of a named individual by the International 
Criminal Court.37 However, the entire section 2003 
waiver may not be executable on its face. The waiver 
requires that the ICC enter into a binding agreement 
with the United States “that prohibits the [ICC] from 
seeking to exercise jurisdiction” over U.S. personnel.38 
Such a binding agreement would not be possible to 
achieve in practice, given it would require the ICC to 
relinquish its own jurisdiction. 
Regarding peace keeping efforts, section 2005 still 
allows for U.S. participation if the President obtains a 
“national interest certification.”39 This certification 
requires U.S. Armed Forces participating in peace 
keeping activities to be the subject of immunity, from 
risk of criminal prosecution or other assertion of the 
jurisdiction of the ICC,40 and it relies on “factual 
judgments made by the President.”41 Both Presidents 
Bush and Obama have obtained national interest 
                                                          
35 148 CONG. REC. 14,049-14,050 (2002). 
36 ASPA §§ 2001-2015. 
37 ASPA § 2003. 
38 ASPA § 2003(a)(2). 
39 ASPA § 2005(c), (2008); 148 CONG. REC. 14,049 (2002). 
40 ASPA §§ 2003-2005 (2008). 
41 148 CONG. REC. 14,049 (2002). 
certifications to allow U.S. Armed Forces to participate 
in U.N. peacekeeping efforts.42 
Before the 2008 amendment to the ASPA, the 
provisions of section 2007 restricted military aid to 
parties to the Rome Statute.43 Article 98 waivers were 
obtained to waive the restriction on military 
assistance.44 These agreements provided immunity to 
U.S. personnel from ICC prosecution in exchange for a 
waiver on restrictions to U.S. military aid. However, 
the 2008 amendment to the ASPA removed section 
2007 and the restrictions on military aid.45 
Unresolved questions regarding penalties for 
breach 
Currently, there are no explicitly defined penalties for 
breach of the ASPA in the text, or stated through 
Congressional interpretation of the Act. Neither intra-
governmental penalties nor penalties for private 
individuals or institutions exist within the text. 
                                                          
42 President Bush authorized the participation of U.S. Armed Forces 
in the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), 
while also declaring U.S. Forces immune from ICC jurisdiction: 
Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, 
Certification Concerning U.S. Participation in the United Nations-
African Union Mission in Darfur Under Section 2005 of the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (26 March 2008), 
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/03/print/20080327-
1.html . In 2012, President Obama authorized U.S. participation in 
the United Nations Mission in South Sudan: Memorandum from the 
President to the Secretary of State, Certification Concerning U.S. 
Participation in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan 
Consistent with Section 2005 of the American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act (10 January 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/01/10/presidential-memorandum-certification-
concerning-us-participation-united . Additionally, national interest 
certifications have been used to authorize the involvement of U.S. 
Armed Forces in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): 
Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, 
Certification Concerning U.S. Participation in the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti Consistent with Section 2005 of the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (14 June 2004), 
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040614-10.html ; 
Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State, 
Certification concerning U.S. participation in the U.N. mission in 
Liberia consistent with Section 2005 of the American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (20 October 2003), 
http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031020-9.html . 
43 ASPA § 2007 (2002). 
44 A list of the waivers can be found at Georgetown Law Library, 




45 Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Signs H.R. 4986, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into 
Law, (28 January 2008); ASPA §§ 2001-2015 (2008). 
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Further, it does not appear that any breaches of the 
ASPA have occurred, or penalties for breach been 
imposed. 
The current extent of U.S. cooperation 
with the ICC 
The current U.S. administration is increasing 
cooperation with the ICC, while maintaining 
reservations and control over the information it 
shares with the ICC. On 23 March 2010, at a meeting 
of the Assembly of States Parties in New York, 
Ambassador Stephen Rapp, the Ambassador-at-Large 
on War Crimes Issues at the U.S. Department of State, 
delivered a speech in which he indicated that the 
United States wished to strengthen and improve its 
relationship with the ICC.46 
President Obama has since taken steps toward 
improving relations with the ICC. In March 2010, 
President Obama affirmed his commitment to 
“support[] the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that 
advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the 
requirements of U.S. law.”47 Further, in October 2012, 
Susan Rice, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations, said the U.S. had “actively engaged with the 
ICC Prosecutor and Registrar” to support “specific 
prosecutions already underway” and has “responded 
positively to informal requests for assistance.”48 
The Obama Administration has also taken direct 
action to improve cooperation with the ICC. The 
President signed into law a State Department program 
that issues rewards for information regarding certain 
ICC suspects-at-large.49 Ambassador Rapp stated the 
                                                          
46 Stephen J. Rapp, Statement by Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Regarding Stocktaking at the 
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Corrections Act of 2012, on 15 January 2013 (S.2318A), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s2318enr/pdf/BILLS-
112s2318enr.pdf . See Statement by the President on Enhanced 
State Department Rewards Program (15 January 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/15/statement-
president-enhanced-state-department-rewards-program . 
program “would be crime-specific, not court-specific 
and would allow the United States to engage more 
fully in pursuit of ... foreign nationals.”50 In May 2013, 
the State Department announced that it was offering 
monetary rewards for information leading to the 
arrest and surrender of Joseph Kony and other 
commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army – all of 
whom have been indicted by the ICC.51 The U.S. also 
facilitated the transfer of suspect Bosco Ntaganda to 
The Hague when he appeared at the U.S. embassy in 
Kigali, Rwanda.52 These actions fall within the scope of 
the Dodd Amendment, concerning, as they do, 
prosecution of foreign nationals by the ICC. 
The Obama Administration has also taken actions 
apart from direct cooperation with the ICC (and 
outside of ASPA’s reach) that may support the 
interests of the Office of the Prosecutor. On 4 August 
2011, President Obama issued Presidential Study 
Directive 10, establishing an interagency Atrocities 
Prevention Board (“the Board”).53 According to the 
Directive, the “primary purpose of the Atrocities 
Prevention Board shall be to coordinate a whole of 
government approach to preventing mass atrocities 
and genocide.” Further, the Board ensures increased 
monitoring and capacity to prevent and respond to 
atrocities. Importantly, it will examine protocols to 
share intelligence with institutions in response to 
atrocities. In a recent fact sheet on the Board, an 
affirmation of support for “national, hybrid, and 
international mechanisms (including, among other 
things, commissions of inquiry, fact finding missions, 
and tribunals)” was made.54 As well, it detailed actions 
like “the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions 
1970 and 1973, which authorized – in an 
unprecedented combination of measures – referral of 
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the situation in Libya to the International Criminal 
Court,” and the support to capture “priority figures 
wanted by international tribunals (including Goran 
Hadzic and Ratko Mladic).”55 
Conclusion 
The Obama Administration has increased efforts to 
cooperate with the ICC, as well as to improve U.S. 
responses to atrocity crimes. This increased American 
openness to aiding in the prosecution of crimes at the 
international level suggests that a thorough review 
should be undertaken, in order to consider how public 
and private entities in the United States could lawfully 
respond to digital information requests from the ICC. 
In particular, U.S.-based ISPs can review their 
responses to the sharing of data with the ICC, 
although the ICC may not be able to directly request 
information from private entities. 
The ASPA already provides some tools for increased 
responsiveness to the ICC. First, the Dodd 
Amendment can continue to be invoked in the case-
by-case manner in which it is currently used to share 
information and to otherwise support particular cases 
proceeding before the ICC. Second, the President can 
invoke the section 2011 waiver, which allows use of 
executive Commander in Chief powers. This waiver 
could potentially be used to assist in the apprehension 
of suspects and their subsequent transfer to the 
control of the ICC. It could also be used to provide 
relevant, classified national security information to 
the ICC. Third, the President can increase use of 
section 2005 to further U.S. participation in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. The President only needs to 
provide to Congress the “national interest 
certification”, which ensures the operation supports 
U.S. interests and that U.S. personnel will not be 
subjected to prosecution by the ICC. Finally, 
cooperation external to the ICC can be expanded, 
such as through development of the Atrocities 
Prevention Board and the State Department’s 
Rewards Program. 
Changes to or clarifications of internal interpretations 
of the ASPA could make the extent of its reach 
regarding digital evidence much clearer. This would 
include defining any application of the ASPA to private 
entities, such as ISPs, since it appears the ASPA 
currently only extends to public entities. Clarity is also 
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needed regarding whether or not the Act extends to 
data outside of the U.S. that is controlled by U.S.-
based companies, especially considering that U.S. 
companies control the vast majority of digital 
information. Furthermore, any potential penalties for 
breach of the ASPA should be made clear. 
As Senator Dodd has stated, the ASPA is very complex, 
and “[t]here are waivers within waivers which turn 
out not to be waivers at all because the conditions of 
the waivers are unattainable in many instances.”56 
Further clarification is required to understand how the 
Act applies to digital evidence and the circumstances 
surrounding increased U.S. engagement with the ICC. 
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